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Abstract 
In electric power systems, balancing authorities adjust the output of dispatchable coal and natural 
gas generators in response to changes in net load (electricity demand minus variable generation such as 
wind).  As penetration of renewable energy increases, so do the variability and uncertainty surrounding 
net load, making balancing more difficult.  The flexibility of the system to ramp power output up and 
down (i.e. ramping capability) may be insufficient to accommodate large changes in net load, potentially 
leading to scarcity events and threatening system security.  The Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator (MISO) has proposed ancillary service products called up-ramp capability (URC) and down-
ramp capability (DRC) intended to increase system flexibility.   
The purpose of this study is to explore the economic, environmental, and reliability impacts of 
MISO’s proposed ramp capability products.  Two versions of the unit commitment and economic 
dispatch processes used by MISO to optimally schedule generators were modeled: (1) a baseline model 
representing current MISO practices, and (2) a ramp capability model that includes the proposed 
products.  These models were applied to a small power system representative of MISO’s mix of 
generators under low and high wind penetration levels. 
In this model the DRC product had no impact, indicating that the representative power system was 
more flexible in the downward direction than MISO’s actual system, perhaps due to model 
simplifications or inaccurate assumptions.  The URC product, however, did benefit the system.  Results 
show a reduction in the frequency of energy and operating reserve shortages when compared to the 
baseline model, particularly with high wind penetration, thereby indicating improved reliability.  While 
there was a small price increase in non-shortage intervals due to procurement of URC, this was 
outweighed by the avoidance of high penalty prices incurred in shortage intervals; the overall average 
market clearing price was significantly reduced.  The URC product also caused a small amount of fuel 
switching from coal to the more flexible natural gas, slightly reducing the system’s CO2 emissions.  
However, the more pronounced environmental benefit was the URC product’s ability to help the system 
absorb increased wind penetration while avoiding most of the corresponding increase in reliability 
problems. 
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1. Introduction 
In electric power systems, supply (i.e., generation) and demand (i.e., load) must be essentially equal 
at all times.  Balancing Authorities are tasked with maintaining this balance in a particular region 
through the adequate scheduling of power generation plants and imports and exports  of electricity.  In 
regions of the United States where there has been restructuring of the electricity industry to enable 
wholesale markets, Independent System Operators (ISOs) administer the markets and act as the 
Balancing Authorities.  ISOs, as their name suggests, are independent of both electricity generators and 
load-serving utilities.  Their primary objective is to deliver electricity to meet demand at the lowest cost, 
while maintaining system stability [1].  In order to do so, ISOs run computer programs executing unit 
commitment (UC) and economic dispatch (ED) algorithms to schedule power plants’ operation for every 
time interval.  In essence, generators offer to supply a specified quantity of electricity at a particular 
price, along with various operating parameters.  These offers are run through an optimization model to 
find the least-cost combination of generation that meets the forecasted load and all system constraints.  
In a competitive market, generators are expected to offer electricity at their marginal costs, and all 
generators that are called to operate are paid the marginal cost of the last unit of generation necessary 
to meet demand, called the market clearing price (MCP) [2].  Typically ISOs run several versions of the 
UC and ED models, including a day-ahead model that considers hourly intervals, and real-time dispatch 
(RTD), which works in 5-minute intervals.   
 The corollary to the requirement that supply and demand be in balance at al l times is that changes 
in load must be met by changes in generation in near real -time.  The uncertainty of electricity demand 
and of the availability of transmission lines and power generation units makes necessary the provision of 
a number of ancillary services to guarantee system reliability.  Two of those services are frequency 
regulation and operating reserve.  Generators that provide frequency regulation are equipped with 
Automatic Generation Controllers (AGC) that allow them to quickly (i.e. in milliseconds to seconds) raise 
or lower their real power generation levels in response to small changes in system frequency resulting 
from temporary  imbalances between electrical load and generation.  Operating reserve is generation 
capacity that is not scheduled to produce energy, but can be deployed as needed to cover imbalances 
due to sudden, unexpected outages of transmission lines or scheduled generation resources .  Much like 
the energy market, generators supply offers for four separate ancillary services products: regulation up 
(ability to increase generation), regulation down (ability to decrease generation), spinning reserve (from 
units that are running, but not fully dispatched) and non-spinning reserve (from units which are 
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available but not running).  The ISO purchases the combination of energy and ancillary services that 
minimizes overall system cost [3]. 
 
1.1 Ramping Needs in a Power System 
Because electrical load varies with time, generation must be continuously adjusted.  While 
frequency regulation is designed to respond to load changes within a dispatch interval, it is necessary 
that other generators within the system ramp up and ramp down their power output as needed to 
handle changes between intervals as well as to replace regulation as quickly as possible to free it for use 
in future intervals.  The “ramping capability” of generators is information that must be submitted by 
operators to the ISO.  Hence, as part of their offers, generators submit ramp rates (maximum rate of real 
power output change, measured in MW/minute), startup time, and minimum and maximum generation.  
This information constitutes additional constraints in the UC and ED optimization problems that ISOs run 
to minimize system’s costs while meeting demand and reliability standards.  For example, one such 
constraint is that the energy that a generator supplies in some interval, t, must be less than or equal to 
the energy supplied in the previous interval, t-1, plus its maximum ramp rate times the length of the 
interval.  Because current real-time UC and ED algorithms do not look ahead to consider energy demand 
levels in future intervals, there are times when there is insufficient ramping capability in the system.  To 
the extent that this is forecasted, system operators can make out-of-market adjustments to ensure 
future need is met by requiring some generators to increase or decrease their power output deviating 
from the optimal amount suggested by the UC and ED algorithms.  While these adjustments are 
necessary from a reliability standpoint, this practice tends to be uneconomic and inconvenient.  
Generators that are manually dispatched by the system operator in response to a ramping need, rather 
than by the optimization software, are not eligible to set the MCP.  However, they are eligible to receive 
a revenue sufficiency guarantee (RSG) payment equal to the difference between the generator’s offer 
price and the MCP to ensure they are able to fully recover their costs [4].  The frequency of out-of-
market adjustments increases when load changes unexpectedly and there is scarce availability of 
generation to meet it.  In these cases, ISOs activate a process of “scarcity pricing” which sets the market 
clearing prices at levels commensurate with the Value of Lost Load (VOLL)  and causes significant price 
spikes.  Beyond the increased electricity prices, this process of addressing ramping requirements out of 
the market hides the magnitude and severity of the problem and does not contribute to its prevention 
as it does not provide clear price signals to market participants to increase ramping capability [5]. 
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1.2 Increased ramping needs in systems with high penetration of variable generation 
Ramping needs are caused by other factors beyond sudden changes in electrical load.  There are at 
least three other causes of increases in the amount of ramping capability required in a system: changes 
in variable energy resources (VERs) such as wind and solar power, changes in imports and exports, and  
 
 
Figure 1 – Impact of wind generation on ramping needs in MISO.  Part (a) shows hourly load, wind and net load 
May 18, 2013.  In addition to actual wind levels, a scenario with twice as much wind generation is shown.  
Although not always the case, on this  particular day wind tended to ramp in the opposite direction as load, 
increasing the need for ramping capability.  Part (b) shows the ramping need within each hour of load, net load, 
and net load with twice as much wind generation.  Ramp requirements incr ease as wind is added to the system.       
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deviations from instructed levels of generation by generating units.  Each of these are beyond the 
control of the system operator, but must be met by resources that are within the operator’s control.  
Therefore, when discussing ramping needs, it makes more sense to refer to net load and dispatchable 
generation.  For the purposes of this paper, we ignore imports, exports and generator deviations and 
define net load as the difference between the system’s load and non-dispatchable (i.e. VER) resources as 
follows: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1) 
 
Dispatchable generation consists of all generating units whose output the system operator can control, 
typically thermal plants such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear.  The change in net load between time 
intervals is the ramp need.  Net load tends to have steeper slopes and greater uncertainty than load 
alone.  As penetration of renewables increases, the issue will only be exacerbated further [5].  Figure 1 
shows the relationship between load, wind generation, and net load in the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) 
system on May 18, 2013.  As wind penetration increases, the ramping need that must be met with other 
generators increases in both the up and down directions. 
 
1.3 MISO’s proposal to address ramping needs 
In the U.S. two ISOs, MISO [5] and the California ISO (CAISO) [6] have both proposed adding 
additional ancillary service products for flexible ramp capability to their markets.  Their proposals are 
quite similar, but have slightly different formulations; this Master’s project focuses on MISO’s version.  
MISO’s proposal is to modify their UC and ED algorithms by directly accounting for the economic 
value of provisioning an adequate level of ramping capability as represented by a demand curve of 
ramping.  In the context of these modifications, two new “products” arise: up-ramp capability (URC) and 
down-ramp capability (DRC).  These products are symmetrical in their derivations, but will likely have 
very different prices and quantities required for a given interval.  By procuring the ramp capability 
products the ISO intends to address both forecasted variability in net load as well as unexpected ramp 
needs (when load or generation deviate from their forecasts).  The range of uncertainty is calculated 
using historical deviations from forecasts over similar intervals to identify a set number of standard 
deviations to cover a desired percentage of cases.  For example, assuming normal distribution of 
forecast errors, 95.4% of the deviations are within two standard deviations of the forecast, while 99.8% 
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of all cases are within 3 standard deviations of the forecasts.  The targeted amount of up- and down-
ramp capability constraints can be generally formulated as: 
𝑈𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =
max {(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡) + 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑝𝑡+𝑛,0} 
 
(2) 
 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =
max{(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+𝑛) + 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡+𝑛,0} 
(3) 
 
 
It is important to note that ramp capability may or may not be deployed.  It is simply available for 
the real-time dispatch to use if needed.  Depending on system conditions, ramp capacity from interval t 
may be deployed as energy in interval t+1, may continue to be used as ramp capacity, or neither.  The 
new dispatch for interval t+1 simply uses available resources as economically as possible without 
considering previously cleared ramp capability.   
Ramping capability will be simultaneously co-optimized with energy and ancillary products.  Under 
MISO’s proposal, generators will not separately offer ramp capability, nor can they opt out of offering 
ramp capacity.  By submitting an offer to provide energy, they are essentially submitting an offer to 
provide whatever combination of energy and ramping capacity the dispatch model finds most cost-
effective to the system (and indeed, MISO and all other system operators routinely require plants with 
ramping capacity to ramp up and down as it is).  Generators selected to provide ramp capability will be 
paid based on their opportunity cost of doing so.  This is different from other ancillary services (for 
which generators do submit offers) because unlike reserve and regulation, there are no additional 
requirements for providing ramping capacity.  
  URC and DRC are added as constraints to the model, which in any given interval will either add to 
the total system cost or be cost neutral.  In the case of URC, if the dispatch must be altered so that a 
lower cost but faster ramping unit reserves some energy to meet the ramping capability, the missing 
energy must be replaced by a higher cost unit.  The difference in price between the two generators’ 
energy offers is the opportunity cost of procuring ramp capability and is the shadow price of the ramp 
capability constraint.  The shadow price sets the market price for URC and generators providing URC are 
paid that amount to compensate them for their reduced energy award.  Similarly, if a high-cost flexible 
unit would otherwise be operating at its minimum level but its energy level must be increased to meet 
the DRC constraint, it will be replacing a lower-cost unit.  Again, the increased system cost is the 
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difference in energy offers between the two generators.  In this case, the generator providing DRC 
would be providing energy above the energy market price and the DRC payment compensates for this.   
In many intervals it is likely that sufficient ramping capacity is available in the system without the ramp 
capability constraints.  In these intervals, the URC and DRC constraints are non-binding.  There is no 
additional system cost to procure ramp capability, thus URC and DRC price is set to $0.   
At times there may be insufficient power generation capacity that can be economically dispatched 
to meet both current energy and ramping for future needs.  When this occurs, using generation for 
current energy should take clear priority.  Demand curves for both up- and down-ramp capability are 
defined, which indicate the value of the ramp capability to the system and set an effective cap on the 
amount to be procured.  MISO’s proposal indicates that a single segment ( i.e. flat) demand curve will be 
used whose precise value will be determined using a historical statistical analysis.  The expected range of 
$5-$20  is much lower than that of operating reserve and regulation scarcity pricing, indicating that at 
times of scarcity, ramp capacity will be the lowest priority for generation resources [5]. 
Figure 2 illustrates the five possible scenarios that could occur in any given interval depending on 
ramping capability required, baseline levels of ramping capability and the economics of available power 
generators.  In this example, the demand price is set at $10/MW for all intervals.  In this particular 
interval for scenarios 2 – 5, historical analysis has indicated that the system should procure 100 MW of 
URC.  
1. For a particular interval, historical analysis could determine that there is a very low 
likelihood of a need for any ramp capability and set the target amount to 0 MW. 
2. If the system without the ramping constraint would have provided 120 MW anyway, the 
URC constraint is non-binding and the price is set at $0/MW.   
3. If the system wouldn’t naturally provide sufficient URC, but the cost of doing so is relatively 
low, the full 100 MW will be procured and the price will be set below the demand curve 
value, in this case $6/MW. 
4. If the opportunity cost of providing ramp capability is high, the price will be capped at 
$10/MW which will limit the amount procured, in this case to 60 MW, leaving a shortage of 
URC. 
5. If providing any amount of ramping capability is higher than the price cap, none will be 
procured. 
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Figure 2: Demonstration of the five possible scenarios given a $10/MW URC demand curve price.  The upward-
sloping lines represent URC supply curves and the diamond markers indicate the market clearing quantity and 
price in each scenario.  Scenario 1: Historical analysis determines no URC is needed.  Scenario 2: Historical analysis 
targets 100 MW of URC.  Existing generators provide 120 MW, so no additional URC is procured; the price is 
$0/MW.  Scenario 3: Historical analysis targets 100 MW of URC.  There is insufficient ramp capability in the system, 
so the ramp capability constraint is binding.  All  120 MW are able to be procured for less  than the $10/MW 
demand curve price cap.  Scenario 4: Historical analysis targets 100 MW of URC.  There is insufficient ramp 
capability in the system, so the ramp capability constraint is binding.  Only some ramp capability is able to be 
procured below the $10/MW demand curve price cap, so there is a shortage of URC.  Scenario 5: Historical analysis 
targets 100 MW of URC.  However, the cost to provide any URC is greater than the $10/MW price cap and 
therefore none is procured. 
 
MISO generally allocates costs based either on which participants benefit from a product or on 
which participants cause the costs to occur.  Benefit-based costs would be allocated to load and exports 
(which is how operating reserve is currently allocated).  Cause-based costs would be allocated to all four 
sources of variability (load, variable generation, net imports, and traditional generation).  This would 
entail a very complex rate design; furthermore, most of the need for URC and DRC (both forecasted 
variability and uncertainty) is currently due to load and changes in net imports.  Thus, even under cause-
based allocation, a very small percentage of costs would be assigned to generation, and this small 
difference is not worth the complexity required.  Therefore, MISO currently plans to use benefit-based 
costs [5]. 
While electricity costs will be slightly higher under normal conditions due to the need to procure 
extra generation.  MISO expects that the URC and DRC products will provide a number of benefits to the 
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system.  First and foremost is a reduction in the magnitude and frequency of short-term scarcity 
conditions which cause energy market price spikes.  There should be less need to dispatch high cost 
resources, particularly uneconomic CT generators which currently are used to provide ramping in short-
term dispatch.  There should be a reduced need for operators to provide manual inte rventions to the 
dispatch, which in turn will increase transparency and consistency.  The supply of ramp capability will be 
transparently priced, which may increase the incentives for generators to invest in faster-ramping 
generation.  Finally, reliability should be increased by reducing the frequency of reserve shortages.   
MISO estimates the net savings of offering this product to be in the range of $3.8-5.4 million/year under 
current conditions [5]. 
 
1.4 Previous studies of the effects of introducing ramping products 
Navid and Rosenwald [7] provide a basic formulation for ramp capability in a real-time economic 
dispatch model.  Several small scale examples with five or fewer generators are provided demonstrating 
the benefits under both single-interval and multiple interval optimizations, as well as an application in 
which generators can make ramp capability offers.  In a later white paper outlining the specifics of 
MISO’s proposed ramp capability product, Navid and Rosenwald [5] provide significantly more detail, as 
well as additional  five-generator examples demonstrating how the ramp capability products would be 
introduced in the day-ahead unit commitment model and its impacts on billing.  Additionally, 4 sample 
days with various net load and ramping profiles were selected and dispatched based on actual MISO 
data both with and without the ramp capability product for comparison.  In a similar white paper for 
CAISO, Xu and Tretheway [6] present CAISO’s proposed model, a method for deriving a stepped demand 
curve, and several small illustrative examples. Finally, Wang and Hobbs [8] compare costs and benefits 
of a deterministic dispatch model with the ramp product both to the standard dispatch model and to 
the stochastic ideal.  In general the literature thus far indicates that the proposed ramp capability 
products improve system reliability when compared to existing ISO practices.  Small increases in MCPs 
are found in some intervals in order to procure the ramp capability, but overall system costs are lowered 
due to a reduction in scarcity pricing and/or uplift payments.  Wang and Hobbs concur but note the 
importance of careful selection of market elements in order to maximize system efficiency.  
 
1.5 Objectives of this Master’s Project. 
The purpose of this work is to further explore the economic, environmental, and reliability costs and 
benefits of MISO’s proposed ramp capability products.  To do so, we modeled both the day-ahead unit 
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commitment and real-time economic dispatch processes with and without the proposed products.  We 
applied the models to a small power system representative of MISO’s mix of generators using three 
monthly net load patterns selected from summer, winter, and shoulder (spring/fall) seasons under both 
low and high wind penetration levels.  This is both a larger test system and a much longer simulation run 
than in examples in previous studies.  In particular, we consider to what extent the addition of the ramp 
capability products reduces scarcity events and how the products impact energy prices, the generation 
fuel mix, and CO2 emissions. 
 
2. Methods 
Our general method to assess the benefits of ramping products consisted of reproducing the 
optimization models used by electric power system operators to schedule energy and operating reserve 
at the lowest cost, and applying them to a scale representation of a system to perform parametric 
analysis on important variables.  Hence, we developed a market clearing model that is in fact composed 
of two sub-models: unit commitment (UC) and economic dispatch (ED), where electrical generators are 
represented in terms of their marginal generation costs, startup costs, fixed or no-load costs, maximum 
up- and down-ramping rates, maximum and minimum generation levels, and minimum up and down 
times.  The UC model is a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) that takes as inputs generators’ phys ical 
constraints and cost parameters as well as system requirements and conditions such as load and wind 
generation levels and required reserve margins to produce a schedule that commits resources at the 
lowest cost (a committed resource is one that is scheduled to be on and producing electricity for the 
grid).  The integer decision variables in this problem are associated with the commitment (i.e. on/off) 
status of generating units and the corresponding costs.  ED is a linear program (LP) that is similar to UC, 
but has some key differences.  Within this program, the commitment status of a generation unit is no 
longer a decision variable, and instead is taken as given by the solution of the previously run  unit 
commitment model.  Outputs of economic dispatch include market clearing prices and energy and 
reserve levels for each generator.  Because of the long startup time of many generators as well as the 
unpredictable nature of net load, system operators run the models on multiple time scales ranging in 
length from several days to five minutes.  In ISOs, the two most prominent model runs correspond with 
the day-ahead and real-time markets.   
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2.1 Simulation overview 
To simulate MISO market operations, we developed three baseline models: day-ahead unit 
commitment (B-DAUC), day-ahead economic dispatch (B-DAED), and real-time economic dispatch (B-
RTED).  The two day-ahead models use day-ahead forecasts of load and wind generation to produce 
optimal hourly commitment, generation, and reserve schedules and market prices for a 24-hour period.  
A single iteration of the B-DAUC/B-DAED model optimizes over the full 24-hour period.  The B-RTED 
model takes as inputs the commitment schedule from the day-ahead market and actual load and wind 
power levels, and produces the least-cost generation and reserve schedules and market prices for a 
single 10-minute interval (without considering future forecasts).  This is consistent with current MISO 
practices, which do not consider any “look-ahead” in the RTED process, although doing so is currently 
under consideration [9].  A full one-day simulation consists of one iteration each of the B-DAUC and B-
DAED models and 144 (i.e. 6 iterations/hour * 24hours) iterations of the B-RTED model.   
We developed a second set of DAUC, DAED, and RTED models that include MISO’s proposed ramp  
capability products (RC-DAUC, RC-DAED, RC-RTED), but otherwise operate identically to the baseline 
models.  We ran daily simulations using the same inputs on both the baseline and ramp capability 
models for three one-month intervals: January, June and April, representing the three seasonal load 
profiles and compare economic reliability and economic outcomes.  The entire process was performed 
for both low and high wind penetration levels of 7% and 13% by installed nameplate capacity.   
 
2.2 Baseline Models 
2.2.1 Baseline Model Notation 
Indices 
u: Index for dispatchable unit, 𝑢 ∈ 1. . 𝑈 
t: Index for time interval, 𝑡 ∈ 0. . 𝑇  
n: Intermediate time interval index used for minimum up and downtime requirements, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑡. . 𝑇 
 
System Requirement Parameters 
T: Number of intervals in time horizon 
U: Number of dispatchable generators in the system 
IntLength: Length of each time interval [minutes] 
FDemandt: Forecasted system demand in interval t [MW] 
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ActDemandt: Actual system demand in interval t [MW] 
VForecastt: Forecasted wind power in interval t [MW] 
VAvailablet: Actual available wind power in interval t [MW] 
SpinReqt: Quantity of spinning reserve required in interval t [MW] 
ResResponseTime: Time by which reserve provided by generator u must be deployable [minutes] 
 
System Penalty Parameters 
OverGenPen: System-wide over generation penalty [$/MWh] 
UnderGenPen: System-wide under generation penalty [$/MWh] 
SRScarcityPen: System-wide spinning reserve shortage penalty [$/MWh] 
 
Generator Cost Parameters 
MCu: Marginal Cost of operating dispatchable unit u [$/MWh] 
SRCu: Cost of spinning reserve provided by unit u [$/MWh] 
NLCu: No load cost (fixed operation cost) of operating unit u [$/interval] 
StartCu: Cost of starting unit u [$] 
 
Generator Operating Parameters 
Commitu,t: Commitment status of unit u in interval t (only a parameter in economic dispatch 
models) [binary] 
MaxGenu: Maximum generation of unit u [MW] 
MinGenu: Minimum generation of unit u [MW] 
PosRampRateu: Maximum ramp-up rate of generator u [MW/minute] 
NegRampRateu: Maximum ramp-down rate of generator u [MW/minute] 
MinUTu: Minimum uptime of unit u [intervals] 
MinDTu: Minimum downtime of unit u [intervals] 
InitMinUpu: Number of intervals generator u must be up at the start of the optimization period 
due to its initial uptime [intervals] 
InitMinDownu: Number of intervals generator u must be down at the start of the optimization 
period due to its initial downtime [intervals] 
Commit0u: Commitment status of unit u at end of previous time horizon [binary] 
Gen0u: Generation level of unit u at end of previous time horizon [MW] 
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SR0u: Spinning reserve provided by unit u at end of previous time horizon [MW] 
FutureSDu: Number of intervals beyond the end of the RTED time horizon that unit u will shut 
down [intervals] 
 
Decision Variables 
Genu,t: Average power generation of unit u in interval t [MW] 
SRu,t: Spinning reserve provided by unit u in interval t [MW] 
Commitu,t: Commitment status of unit u in interval t (only a decision variable in unit commitment 
models) [binary] 
StartCostu,t: Startup cost of unit u in interval t [$] 
OverGent: Surplus of generation over demand in interval t [MW] 
UnderGent: Shortage of generation below demand in interval t [MW] 
UnmetSRt: Shortage of spinning reserve below requirement in interval t [MW] 
VSchedulet: Quantity of variable generation scheduled in interval t [MW] 
 
2.2.2 Baseline Day-Ahead Unit Commitment (B-DAUC) Model 
The B-DAUC model is responsible for committing generators to meet forecasted net load at the 
lowest cost.  We formulate it as an MILP as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ (∑(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑢 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑢 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐿𝐶𝑢 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢,𝑡)
𝑈
𝑢=1
+
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑛 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑛 + 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑒𝑛) 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
Such that:   
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,0 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡0𝑢   ∀ 𝑢 
 
 
              
(5) 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,0 = 𝐺𝑒𝑛0𝑢   ∀ 𝑢 (6) 
𝑆𝑅𝑢,0 = 𝑆𝑅0𝑢   ∀ 𝑢 (7) 
∑ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
     ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(8) 
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∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
 
(9) 
 
𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (10) 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐶𝑢 ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡−1)    ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (11) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (12) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (13) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (14) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (15) 
 
𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(16) 
 
∑ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡) = 0
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑢
𝑡=1
    ∀ 𝑢 
 
 
(17) 
 
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑛 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑇𝑢 ∗
𝑡+𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑇𝑢−1
𝑛=𝑡
 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡−1)  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈
{𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑢 + 1, 𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑇𝑢 + 1} 
 
 
(18) 
 
∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑛 − (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡−1)) ≥ 0
𝑇
𝑛=𝑡
    ∀ 𝑢, ∀𝑡 ∈
{𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑇𝑢 + 2, 𝑇} 
 
 
(19) 
 
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡 = 0
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢
𝑡=1
    ∀ 𝑢 
 
 
(20) 
 
∑ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑛) ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑇𝑢 ∗
𝑡+𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑇𝑢−1
𝑛=𝑡
 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡)  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈
{𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢 + 1, 𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑇𝑢 + 1} 
 
(21) 
 
14 
 
∑ ((1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑛) − (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡)) ≥ 0
𝑇
𝑛=𝑡
    ∀ 𝑢, ∀𝑡 ∈
{𝑇 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑇𝑢 + 2, 𝑇} 
 
 
(22) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 , 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢,𝑡 ,𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ,𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ,𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑢, 𝑡 (23) 
 
The objective function (4) minimizes the total cost of meeting the forecasted load over all intervals 
in the time horizon subject to the constraints (5)-(23).  
Constraints (5)-(7) initialize interval 0 of certain decision variables to the ending status of the 
previous time horizon. 
Constraints (8)-(10) ensure that load and spinning reserve requirements are met in each interval and 
that scheduled wind generation is not greater than the forecast.  A series of penalties and relative prices 
sets priorities in the event that energy and/or spinning reserve requirements cannot be met:   
 Constraint (10) allows wind generation to be curtailed.  However because we assume that 
wind generation has no marginal cost it will be prioritized over dispatchable generators. 
 Because OverGenPen is positive, over generation will only occur if all wind has been 
curtailed. 
 SRScarcityPen is much higher than marginal cost of the most expensive generator, but much 
lower than UnderGenPen, ensuring that energy requirements are prioritized over reserve 
requirements in a shortage event. 
Constraints (12)-(13) ensure that if a generator’s status is on, then it is operating within its upper 
and lower generation limits, and that being called to provide any spinning reserve would not violate the 
upper generation limit.  Constraints (14)-(16) restrict changes in generation and spinning reserve based 
on the generator’s maximum up- and down-ramp rates. 
Many UC formulations include binary variables for startup and shutdown intervals in addition to the 
binary commitment variables.  However Carrión and Arroyo [10] demonstrated a formulation that we 
use here which only utilizes the commitment variables, thereby reducing the number of binary variables 
by 2/3.  Because computational efficiency of MILPs depends heavily on the number of binaries, their 
formulation offers significant savings in computation time, although the corresponding minimum uptime 
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(17) – (19) and downtime (20) – (22) constraints are somewhat more complicated.  An additional 
constraint (11) and decision variable, StartCostu, is necessary in this formulation to ensure that startup 
cost is not negative when the unit is shutting down.  Constraint (23) ensures that the non-binary 
decision variables are not negative. 
 
2.2.3 Baseline Day Ahead Economic Dispatch model (B-DAED) 
Given the commitment output from B-DAUC, B-DAED runs over the same time intervals and uses the 
same load and VER forecasts and produces the optimal dispatch levels for each generator.  B-DAED is an 
LP, so unlike B-DAUC, it is able to generate shadow prices for both energy and spinning reserve, which 
are used as the market clearing prices.  The formulation is as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ (∑(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑢 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑢)
𝑈
𝑢=1
+ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑛 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑛 + 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑒𝑛) 
 
 
(24) 
such that   
   𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,0 = 𝐺𝑒𝑛0𝑢   ∀ 𝑢 
 
 
(25) 
 
𝑆𝑅𝑢,0 = 𝑆𝑅0𝑢   ∀ 𝑢 (26) 
∑ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
     ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(27) 
∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(28) 
 
𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (29) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (30) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (31) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (32) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (33) 
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𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
(34) 
 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 , 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 ,𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 ,𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑅𝑡 ,𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (35) 
 
The components of B-DAUC’s objective function that rely on the commitment decision variable have 
been removed here.  There are no new or modified constraints, although several have been removed.  
The shadow prices of (27) and (28) provide the day-ahead market clearing prices for energy and spinning 
reserve respectively. 
 
2.2.4 Baseline Real-Time Economic Dispatch (B-RTED) Model 
The B-RTED model takes the commitment schedule output from the B-DAUC model and optimizes in 
real-time over a single shorter interval using actual load and VER availability.  The formulation is similar 
to the B-DAED model in section 2.2.3 with three modified constraints reflecting that this model 
considers actual load and variable generation available rather than forecasts, as well as one additional 
constraint. 
 
Constraint (27) is replaced with:   
∑ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
     ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
 
 
(36) 
 
Constraint (29) is replaced with:   
𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(37) 
 
Constraint (33) is replaced with 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(38) 
 
New Constraint:  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡 ≤ (𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐷𝑢 + 𝑇 − 𝑡) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈
1. . 𝑇 
 
(39) 
 
 
Constraint (33) in B-DAED restricts the down-ramp capability of a generator based on both energy 
and spinning reserve in interval t-1.  This is necessary because in the day-ahead models all intervals are 
considered simultaneously.  However, in the real-time model, when only one interval is considered at a 
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time, we know whether or not the spinning reserve was deployed in interval t-1; if it was, it would be 
included in generation from that interval and therefore we do not need to include it in constraint (38).   
Constraint (39) is in place to manage the change in time-resolution between the day-ahead and real-
time interval lengths.  Consider the following example demonstrating the need.  The day-ahead interval 
length is 60 minutes and the real-time interval length is 10 minutes.  Unit A has a ramp rate of 5 MW per 
minute, minimum generation of 20 MW and maximum generation of 200 MW.  In the day-ahead model 
run, it is scheduled to provide 100 MW in the hour ending at 19:00 and shutdown in the following hour.  
With 60 minutes to shut down, the unit can do so within its ramp rate parameter.  In the B-RTED model, 
the generator is scheduled to be on in the interval ending at 19:00 and off in the interval ending at 
19:10.  However, because the B-RTED model only considers one interval at a time, the 19:00 model run 
is not “aware” of the impending shutdown and may dispatch it at 100 MW.  With only 10 minute 
interval lengths, and a 5 MW/minute ramp rate, the unit will be unable to ramp down fast enough to be 
fully shut down by 19:10.  The FutureSDu parameter contains the number of (10 minute) intervals 
beyond the B-RTED horizon that unit u will be shut down, so that constraint (39) limits generation 
accordingly. 
 
2.3 Ramp Capability Models 
We added several additional parameters and decision variables and changed the objective functions 
and constraints in order to implement the ramp capability product for each model. 
 
2.3.1 Ramp Capability Notation 
The ramp capability products require the following parameters and decision variables in addition to 
those found in section 2.2.1. 
System Requirement Parameters 
RCUpDCMaxt: The targeted amount of up-ramp capability (URC) in interval t [MW] 
RCDownDCMaxt: The targeted amount of down-ramp capability (DRC) in interval t [MW] 
RampResponseTime: Response time for ramp capability (used in day-ahead models) [minutes] 
RampInts: Number of intervals for which ramp capability is considered (used in real -time model) 
[intervals] 
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System Price Parameters 
RCUpDCPrice: URC Demand Curve Price [$/MWh] 
RCDownDCPrice: DRC Demand Curve Price [$/MWh] 
 
Decision Variables 
UnitRCUpu,t: URC supplied by unit u in interval t [MW] 
UnitRCDownu,t: DRC supplied by unit u in interval t [MW] 
RCUpt: System URC procured in interval t [MW] 
RCDownt: System DRC procured in interval t [MW] 
 
2.3.2 Ramp Capability Day-Ahead Unit Commitment (RC-DAUC) Model 
The RC-DAUC model is similar to the B-DAUC model found in 2.2.2 with the following changes and 
additions. 
Objective function additional components: 
− ∑(𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
 
(40) 
Change to constraint (12)  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(41) 
 
Change to constraint (13)  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(42) 
 
Change to constraint (16)  
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
+
𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(43) 
 
Additional components to constraint (18) 
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 , 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ,𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡 ,𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 ≥ 0    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(44) 
New Constraints: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢   ∀𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇  
(45) 
𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
(46) 
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𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (47) 
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑢
   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(48) 
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑢
   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(49) 
  
 
Unlike energy and spinning reserve, we formulated ramp capability as a benefit to the system rather 
than a cost to be consistent with MISO’s proposal; therefore the value of additional ramp capability 
procured is subtracted from the cost minimizing objective function (40).  RCUpDCPrice and 
RCDownDCPrice are the demand curve values of procuring additional ramp capability.  Any ramp 
capability whose opportunity cost is higher than these values will not be procured, as the costs will 
outweigh the benefits.  Because this value is much lower than the penalties associated with spinning 
reserve and energy shortages, these other products are prioritized over ramp capability. 
Constraints (41)-(43) and (45) modify the minimum and maximum generation and generator ramp 
rate constraints to ensure that utilization of procured ramping capability does not violate these 
constraints.  Constraint (44) prevents the new decision variables associated with ramp capability from 
being negative. 
RCUpDCMaxt and RCDownDCMaxt are the targeted quantities of ramp capability within the system 
and therefore act as upper bounds on RCUpt and RCDownt, the actual quantities that the system 
procures in constraints (46)-(47).  Constraints (48)-(49) ensure that the actual units within the system 
can provide the amount of ramp capability to be procured.  In intervals where the committed units 
provide more ramp capability than the DCMax target, the system does not need to procure any 
additional ramp capability, so either RCUp or RCDown will be 0. 
 
2.3.3 Ramp Capability Day Ahead Economic Dispatch (RC-DAED) Model 
The RC-DAED model is similar to the B-DAED model with the following changes and additions 
needed to include the ramp capability products: 
 
Objective function additional components:  
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− ∑(𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
(50) 
Change to constraint (30)  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(51) 
 
Change to constraint (31)  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑢,𝑡   ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(52) 
 
Change to constraint (34)  
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
+
𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
 
(53) 
 
Additional components to constraint (35) 
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 , 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ,𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡 ,𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(54) 
New Constraints: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢   ∀𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇  
(55) 
𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (56) 
𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 (57) 
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑢
   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(58) 
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑢
   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(59) 
 
RC-DAED operates similarly to B-DAED, with the changes to accommodate ramp capability described 
in section 2.3.2.  The shadow prices of constraints (56) and (57) are the day-ahead market clearing prices 
of URC and DRC. 
 
2.3.4 Ramp Capability Real-Time Economic Dispatch (RC-RTED) Model 
RC-RTED operates similarly to RC-DAED with the following changes and additions. 
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Change to constraint (27):   
∑ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑈
𝑢=1
     ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
 
 
(60) 
 
Change to constraint (29): 
𝑉𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(61) 
 
Change to constraint (33): 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
(62) 
 
Change to constraint (34): 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
+
𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
≤ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇 
 
 
(63) 
 
Change to constraint (55): 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑢,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
≤ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢   ∀𝑢, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 1. . 𝑇  
 
 
(64) 
New Constraint:  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝑢,𝑡 ≤
(𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐷𝑢 + 𝑇 − 𝑡) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢  ∀ 𝑢, 𝑡 
 
 
(65) 
 
 
The changes in constraints (60)-(62) and new constraint (65) are the same changes we implemented 
between B-DAED and B-RTED in section 2.2.4.  Constraints (63)-(64) represent slightly different purposes 
for the ramp capability products in the day-ahead versus the real-time models.  In the day-ahead models 
we procure ramp capability to ensure that there is sufficient intra-interval flexibility to manage real-time 
variability, and therefore consider a ramp response time measured in minutes.  In the real -time model, 
on the other hand, we procure ramp capability to manage variability and uncertainty in future intervals, 
and thus we consider ramping needs over some number of intervals (RampInts). 
 
2.4 Representative Power System 
We assessed the impact of adding ramp capability products in MISO by running the baseline and 
ramp capability market clearing optimization models on a 6% scale representation of the MISO power 
system.  The following sections describe the way we designed the scale system to represent important 
attributes of the infrastructure, resources and demand in MISO.  
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2.4.1 Capacity Mix and Generator Selection 
We used the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated 
Database 2012 (eGRID), which contains 2009 data, to determine the percentage of generating capacity 
of each major fuel type (Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, Hydro, Wind, and Other) [11].  We chose to only 
utilize coal, natural gas, and wind generation.  Nuclear plants typically have essentially fixed operating 
levels and are extremely slow-ramping, taking multiple days to start up and shut down, and therefore 
neither fit well within the single-day optimization of our model, nor would they be impacted by the 
flexible ramping products.  All other fuel sources represent less than 5% of generating capacity within 
MISO.  We created both a low and high wind scenario representing 2009 and forecasted 2015 wind 
penetration levels respectively.  See Table 1 for capacity mixes of the full MISO system as well as the two 
scenarios.  
2009 MISO Full and 6% Scaled Capacity Mix 
    Coal Natural Gas  Wind  Nuclear Hydro Other Total 
2009 MISO 
Full [11] 
Capacity (MW) 69,718 35,407 8,096 8,597 3,551 7,065 132,434 
% of Total  53% 27% 6% 6% 3% 5% -- 
Low Wind 
Scenario  
Capacity (MW) 4,729 2,354 526 0 0 0 7,609 
% of Total  62% 31% 7% 0% 0% 0% -- 
High Wind 
Scenario  
Capacity (MW) 4,729 2,354 1,060 0 0 0 8,143 
% of Total  58% 29% 13% 0% 0% 0% -- 
Table 1 - Name plate capacity by fuel type of actual 2009 MISO system and our 6% scaled representative grid 
under both high and low wind penetration scenarios. 
 
We performed two-dimensional k-means clustering analysis by name plate capacity and heat rate 
on coal and natural gas combined cycle generators larger than 50 MW listed within eGRID to select 
sample generators.  The coal analysis contained 5 clusters and the natural gas analysis contained 3 
clusters.  The natural gas clusters included only combined cycle plants which represent 90% of the 
natural gas-fired generation in MISO.  See Table 2 for descriptive statistics of coal generator clusters, 
and Table 3 for natural gas generator clusters.  We then randomly selected generators from each cluster 
such that the capacity of selected generators within a cluster was roughly proportionate to the capacity 
of the whole cluster.  Finally, generic sample power plants were created using 1-3 generators of the 
same type.  This procedure ensured that the sample of generators was a good representation of the 
efficiency (as measured by heat rate), fuel source and technology of MISO’s generation capacity.   
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Summary Statistics for Representative Coal Plant Generator Parameters 
    
NP Capacity 
(MW) 
Heat Rate 
(mmBtu/MWh)  
Age as of 2009 
(years) 
Cluster 
1 
Mean 121 11849 47 
Median 114 11498 49 
Standard Deviation 47 2506 9 
Count Minimum 54 9151 19 
98 Maximum 218 31792 60 
Cluster 
2 
Mean 328 11128 38 
Median 324 10958 40 
Standard Deviation 58 899 11 
Count Minimum 231 9458 0 
37 Maximum 441 14359 52 
Cluster 
3 
Mean 82 6756 15 
Median 78 6496 11 
Standard Deviation 20 980 16 
Count Minimum 54 5663 0 
8 Maximum 105 8397 47 
Cluster 
4 
Mean 801 10267 28 
Median 815 9960 30 
Standard Deviation 76 801 9 
Count Minimum 698 9657 2 
14 Maximum 923 12556 38 
Cluster 
5 
Mean 569 10478 33 
Median 574 10427 34 
Standard Deviation 51 747 8 
Count Minimum 456 9200 1 
37 Maximum 640 11958 51 
Overall 
Mean 293 11126 40 
Median 190 10907 40 
Standard Deviation 230 2163 13 
Count Minimum 54 5663 0 
194 Maximum 923 31792 60 
Table 2 - Summary statistics for name plate capacity, heat rate, and age as of 2009 of each of the five clusters 
used to select representative coal generators 
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Summary Statistics for Representative Natural Gas Plant Generator Parameters 
    
NP Capacity 
(MW) 
Heat Rate 
(mmBtu/MWh) 
Age as of 2009 
(years) 
Cluster 
1 
Mean 83 8295 16 
Median 87 8679 14 
Standard Deviation 21 1641 14 
Count Minimum 54 6620 2 
33 Maximum 137 13167 58 
Cluster 
2 
Mean 183 7694 6 
Median 185 7634 6 
Standard Deviation 19 1147 4 
Count Minimum 147 4790 0 
37 Maximum 213 10804 22 
Cluster 
3 
Mean 269 7472 6 
Median 250 7519 6 
Standard Deviation 48 1021 4 
Count Minimum 230 4790 1 
17 Maximum 410 9847 19 
Overall 
Mean 162 7879 10 
Median 171 7634 7 
Standard Deviation 75 1364 10 
Count Minimum 54 4790 0 
87 Maximum 410 13167 58 
Table 3 - Summary statistics for name plate capacity, heat rate, and age as of 2009 of each of the three clusters 
used to select representative natural gas generators 
 
2.4.2 Generator Costs and Operating Parameters 
Most costs and parameters were not readily available and we relied on assumptions drawn from a 
variety of academic and government sources.  In general, we assumed MISO to be a fully competitive 
market in which generators are offering their marginal costs.  For all operating parameters used, see 
Table 4.  For cost parameters, see Table 5. 
We took maximum capacity and CO2 emission rates of generators directly from eGRID 2012 [11]. 
We took information on minimum up time and minimum down time of generators from FERC’s RTO 
Unit Commitment Test System (FRUCTS) [12] which contains parameters and costs for a very large set of 
generators in the PJM system [13].  FRUCTS used PJM’s default system-wide minimum up and down 
times for each fuel type.    
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FRUCTS estimated startup costs and fixed costs based on historic generator bid data and heat rate 
levels in PJM.  We assumed that MISOs generators with similar heat-rates and nameplate capacities 
would have the same startup and fixed costs as those of generators bidding in the PJM market.  
FRUCTS estimated minimum generation based on historic generator output levels within PJM.  We 
again assumed that MISO generators with similar heat-rates and nameplate capacities would have 
similar parameters as those of generators bidding in the PJM market and thereby assign initial minimum 
capacity levels.  However, because our RTED models do not differentiate between operational ramp 
rates and ramp rates at startup or shutdown we needed to adjust each generator’s minimum generation 
value to make sure it was not higher than the plant’s ramping capacity in one real-time interval.  So: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚(𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝐹𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑆 ,𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑢 ∗ 𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ) (66) 
 
We estimated ramp rates based on a comparative study of coal and gas power plants in the US by 
the International Energy Agency which states that coal plants built before 1960 have maximum ramp 
rates of about 0.6% of their nameplate capacity per minute, while coal plants built after 2000 and 
natural gas combined cycle plants could achieve 15-25 MW/minute [14].   For each of the natural gas 
plants as well as the single coal plant built after 2000, we randomly generated a number between 15 
and 25 to serve as the generator ramp rate in MW/minute.  Resulting values are reported in Table 4.  All 
other coal plants were built between 1953 and 1978.  We set their generator ramp rates to between 
0.6% and 2% of name plate capacity. 
We assumed that fuel costs are the only energy marginal costs, and estimated them using eGRID’s 
heat rate data and a best approximation of fuel prices.  Coal price in the electric power sector floated 
between $1.60 and $1.75 per mmBtu in 2011 and 2012 in the West North Central region and between 
$2.30 and $2.40 in the East North Central region, so we used $2/mmBtu [15, 16].  We used $4/mmBtu 
for natural gas, which was the average power plant cost over 2012-13 [17].   
Spinning reserve costs are typically much lower than energy costs.  We assumed spinning reserve 
offers to be 20% of energy marginal cost. 
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Plant 
# Fuel 
# of 
Generators 
Min 
Generation 
(MW) 
Max 
Generation 
(MW) 
Min 
Uptime 
(hours) 
Min 
Downtime 
(hours) 
Max Ramp 
Rate 
(MW/min) 
CO2 Emission 
Rate 
(lb./MWh) 
1 Coal 3 13.5 75.0 9 15 1.4 2,423 
2 Coal 3 33.0 183.3 9 15 3.3 2,288 
3 Coal 3 25.9 144.0 9 15 2.6 2,946 
4 Coal 3 108.3 280.0 9 15 16.6 2,511 
5 Coal 1 4.9 81.6 9 15 0.5 1,785 
6 Coal 2 87.1 725.8 9 15 8.7 2,059 
7 Coal 2 68.9 574.3 9 15 6.9 2,140 
8 
Natural 
Gas 
2 43.6 130.7 2 3 17.5 789 
9 
Natural 
Gas 
2 94.4 283.1 4 5 21.8 1,107 
10 
Natural 
Gas 
2 132.0 396.0 3 6 19.8 858 
11 
Natural 
Gas 
2 122.5 367.5 4 5 22.2 863 
Table 4 - Generator operating parameters in 6% scaled representative grid.  Note that most plants have multiple 
generators; parameters l isted are per-generator, not per-plant.   
 
Plant 
# Fuel 
# of 
Generators 
Energy Cost 
($/MWh) 
Spinning Reserve 
Cost ($/MWh) 
Startup 
Cost ($) 
Fixed Cost 
($/hr.) 
1 Coal 3 23.08 4.62 2,987.83 574.00 
2 Coal 3 21.81 4.36 6,229.04 2,200.00 
3 Coal 3 28.72 5.74 14,066.30 964.00 
4 Coal 3 24.48 4.90 9,761.40 696.00 
5 Coal 1 16.79 3.36 15,231.40 681.00 
6 Coal 2 19.63 3.93 9,254.58 1985.00 
7 Coal 2 20.85 4.17 23,943.40 2000.00 
8 
Natural 
Gas 
2 27.00 5.40 1,949.75 650.00 
9 
Natural 
Gas 
2 37.26 7.45 6,730.83 800.00 
10 
Natural 
Gas 
2 28.89 5.78 6,751.96 1100.00 
11 
Natural 
Gas 
2 29.04 5.81 9,504.82 1250.00 
Table 5 - Generator cost parameters in 6% scaled representative grid.  Note that most plants have multiple 
generators; costs l isted are per-generator, not per-plant. 
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2.4.3 Wind Generation 
We developed two sets of hypothetical wind farms based on 2009 and forecasted 2015 levels  using 
simulated data from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s Eastern Wind Integration and 
Transmission Survey (EWITS) [18]. EWITS data contains day-ahead hourly forecasts and real-time 10-
minute power levels.  To choose the sites, and set their capacity levels, we took the steps below.  See 
Table 6 for calculated wind farm capacity factors. 
Low Wind Scenario 
1. The low wind scenario is based on MISO nameplate wind capacity in 2009 as represented in 
eGRID 2012 of 8087 MW [11].  Four MISO states, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, and North 
Dakota had significantly more installed capacity than other MISO states.   
2. We randomly chose a simulated wind farm from each of the four states from the EWITS 
dataset and ensured the farm was within MISO territory. 
3. We determined a scale value for each simulated wind farm so that their total generation 
would represent 6% of 2009 levels and the proportion of generation of each farm would 
roughly match that of its state’s. 
4. We multiplied the day-ahead and real-time values by the scale factor for each site and then 
summed to get a single set of wind forecasts and real-time generation levels. 
High Wind Scenario 
1. The high wind scenario is based on projected MISO wind capacity in 2015 of 16,600 MW 
[19].  To achieve this capacity of 13%  we assumed installation of the same wind farms 
included in the low-wind scenario and added an additional randomly-selected EWITS farm 
from Illinois, a state which by 2013 had the second-most wind in the region [20].   
2. Steps 3-4 are the same as above except a new scale factor for each farm was selected such 
that their combined nameplate capacity totaled 6% of 2015 projected MISO wind capacity 
with proportions representing 2013 capacity for each state. 
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  Iowa Indiana Minnesota 
North 
Dakota Illinois 
System 
Total 
EWITS Wind farm number 2443 4913 1924 273 7070 -- 
EWITS Site Latitude 42.573 40.095 44.492 45.966 40.337 -- 
EWITS Site Longitude 
-
93.643 -86.491 -95.856 -98.964 -91.333 -- 
EWITS Site Nameplate 
Capacity (MW) 278 279 295 297 295 -- 
2009 State Installed 
Capacity (eGRID) 3,442 1,037 1,603 958 111 8,087 
Low Wind Scenario Scale 
Factor 0.92 0.28 0.41 0.24 -- -- 
Low Wind Scenario 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 256 78 121 71 -- 526 
2013 State Installed 
Capacity (AWEA) (may 
include non-MISO area 
within a state) 5,133 1,543 2,987 1,681 3,568 
16,600 
(MISO 
projected 
2015) 
High Wind Scenario Scale 
Factor 1.25 0.37 0.77 0.43 0.86 -- 
High Wind Scenario 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 346 104 226 128 255 1,059 
Table 6 - Actual wind nameplate capacity in MISO states in 2009 and 2013 and nameplate capacities of 
simulated wind farms in low and high wind scenarios.  Note that the 2009 and 2013 state installed capacities sum 
to less than the MISO system total, as there are other states in the MISO region which contain smaller amounts of 
wind capacity. 
 
2.4.4 Load 
5-Minute real-time load data in MISO is collected and published by LCG Consulting, a firm that 
serves ISO market participants.  We used their data from January, April, and July of 2010 as the real-time 
load for our simulations [21].  Load data was missing for approximately 0.6% of all intervals.  These 
values were estimated using the following methods: 
1. If a single data point was missing, it was replaced with the average of the intervals directly 
preceding and following it. 
2. There were two longer time periods of missing data, one lasting for just over 7 hours, and 
the other for 35 minutes.  In these instances, we generated the missing data using the 5-
minute load changes from the previous day. 
Because the wind data was only available in 10-minute intervals, this was the granularity used for 
our real-time model runs.  We converted the load data to 10-minute intervals by taking the averages of 
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two consecutive intervals.  We then scaled each value down to 6.5% of its original.  Table 7 shows 
minimum, maximum, and average load for each month. 
10-minute Load (MW) - Summary Statistics 
  Min Max Average 
January 3,268 5,568 4,563 
April 2,799 4,548 3,762 
July 3,218 6,779 5,080 
Table 7 - Demand summary statistics for each month 
 
2.4.5 Forecasts 
All day-ahead models rely on hourly forecasts for both load and wind for the following day and the 
real-time ramp capability model uses the forecast for the next 10-minute interval.  The EWITS simulated 
data set that we used for wind generation contains hourly day-ahead forecasts.  However, the other 
forecasts needed to be simulated.  These were randomly generated based on MISO’s reported forecast 
error levels.  MISO’s mean forecast errors are all 0.  Day-ahead load forecast error has a standard 
deviation of 1%.  5-minute load and wind forecast errors have standard deviations of 0.12% and 3%; we 
increased these levels to 0.2% and 4% respectively because we used 10-minute intervals [5]. 
For day-ahead load, we first found the hourly real-time load by averaging the loads from the six 10-
minute intervals.  Next we generated the day-ahead forecast error % by generating a random normal 
variable with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.01.  The day-ahead forecast was set to the real-time 
value increased or decreased by a percentage equal to the randomly generated forecast error, as in (68) 
below: 
Define: 
h: Index for day-ahead time intervals, ℎ ∈ 1. .24 
t: Index for real-time time intervals, 𝑡 ∈ 1. .144 
Eh: Day-ahead load forecast error in interval h (%) 
FDemandh: Day-ahead forecasted load in interval h (MW) 
ActDemandt: Actual real-time demand in interval t (MW)  
 
Day-ahead load forecast formulation: 
𝐸ℎ~𝑁(0, 0.0001) (61) 
𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑ℎ = (1 + 𝐸ℎ) ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑6∗ℎ+1, … 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑6∗ℎ+6) (68) 
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A similar procedure was followed for 10-minute wind and load forecasts.      
 
2.4.6 Other System Parameters 
See Table 8 for all system-wide parameters used in each model.  Selected explanations follow. 
Spinning Reserve Percentage and Reserve Response Time: MISO currently schedules contingency 
reserve of 2,000 MW, all of which must be fully deployed in 10 minutes [22]. This represents about 3.3% 
of MISO’s 2009 average load of 61,000 MW and about 2.1% of 2009 peak load of 96,500 MW.  In our 
system, we scheduled 3.5% of load as spinning reserve in each interval, rather than the annual average. 
Ramp Response Time and Ramp Intervals: MISO’s proposal targets ramp capability to cover 
variability and uncertainty over 10 minutes, or two real-time intervals in their system [5].  Our system 
uses 10-minute intervals, so we targeted ramp capability to cover a single real -time interval.    
Over-generation Penalty, Under-generation penalty, Spinning Reserve Scarcity Price: These three 
values are penalty prices to ensure that supply and demand remain in balance and that sufficient 
spinning reserves are procured if possible.  We set the over-generation penalty to $500/MWh which is 
based on MISO’s offer floor of -$500/MWh.  This was very high in part to prioritize wind curtailment 
before an over-generation event.  We set the under-generation penalty to MISO’s value of lost load of 
$3500/MWh and the spinning reserve scarcity price to MISO’s Operating Reserve Demand Curve 
Scarcity Price of $1100/MWh [3].  These relative values are such that in intervals with insufficient 
generation, the models prioritized meeting energy demand before meeting reserves, which is desirable.    
URC Demand Curve Price and DRC Demand Curve Price: These were based on MISO’s ramp capability 
products proposal and were both set at $10 [5].  These prices ensured that ramp capability was 
procured if it was inexpensive, but wouldn’t be prioritized over energy or spinning reserves.    
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  Model Version 
Variable Name Description 
B-DAUC/ 
B-DAED B-RTED 
RC-DAUC/ 
RC-DAED RC-RTED 
T 
# Intervals in Time Horizon 
[intervals] 
24 1 24 1 
IntLength 
Length of each interval 
[minutes] 
60 10 60 10 
SpinPercentage 
% of load required for spinning 
reserve 
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
ResResponseTime 
time by which spinning reserve 
must be deployable [minutes] 
10 10 10 10 
RampResponseTime 
Response time for ramp 
capability [minutes] 
-- -- 10 -- 
RampInts 
# intervals for which ramp 
capability is considered 
[intervals] 
-- -- -- 1 
OverGenPen 
Over generation penalty 
[$/MWh] 
500 500 500 500 
UnderGenPen 
Under generation penalty 
[$/MWh] 
3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 
SRScarcityPen 
System-wide spinning reserve 
shortage penalty [$/MWh] 
1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
RCUpDCPrice 
URC Demand Curve Price 
[$/MWh] 
10 10 10 10 
RCDownDCPrice 
DRC Demand Curve Price 
[$/MWh] 
10 10 10 10 
Table 8 - System-wide parameters for each of the four combinations of time horizon (day-ahead and real-time) 
and model formulation (baseline and ramp capability) 
 
2.5 Targeted quantity of ramp capability 
The targeted quantity of ramp capability to procure is designed to vary based on both forecasted 
change in net load as well as on uncertainty surrounding that forecast.  Uncertainty is calculated 
through historical statistical analysis of variability in similar intervals.  Therefore, an auxiliary process 
must be run to determine values for RCUpDCMax and RCDownDCMax in each interval.  The basic 
equations for ramp capability are as follows.  Note that in these formulations, DRC and downward 
uncertainty are both non-negative. 
 
Real-time 
𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡) + 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑝𝑡+1,0]  
(69) 
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𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+1) + 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡+1, 0]  
(70) 
 
Day-ahead 
𝑅𝐶𝑈𝑝𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡) ∗
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
+
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑝𝑡 , 0]  
(71) 
𝑅𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑡+1) ∗
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
+
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 ,0]  
(72) 
The difference in the real-time and day-ahead formulations is due to their differing granularity.  The 
real-time model simply attempts to procure enough ramp capability to ensure that it can meet the 
forecast and uncertainty for the following interval (see Figure 3).  The day-ahead model, on the other 
hand, tries to manage the intra-interval variability and uncertainty that will occur when the generating 
units committed in the day-ahead market are used to supply actual load in the more volatile real-time 
market with higher time resolution (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 - Ramp capability target levels in real-time economic dispatch.  The model targets URC and DRC to not 
only meet the forecast in the following interval, but the uncertainty surrounding that forecast as well. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Need for ramp capability in the day ahead model.  The DAUC model run will  procure sufficient ramp 
capability to move from the forecasted average net load in the 7:00 interval to the forecasted average net load in 
the 8:00 interval.  This ensures that 1/6 of that ramp capability will be available in any 10 -minute interval.  
However, even if the forecast is very accurate, the real-time ramping needs may be larger in either direction in any 
10-minute interval. 
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The same uncertainty values were used by the day-ahead and real-time models.  In order to 
calculate these, we took the following steps for both the low and high wind scenarios: 
1. We subtracted real-time wind generation from real-time load to calculate net load for 2009, 
the year preceding the modeled year.   
2. We classified each interval by season, time of day, and whether it fell on a weekend or 
weekday, as each of these categories has a significant impact on direction and quantity of 
ramping need.  We used three seasons, winter, spring/fall, and summer (Table 9).  Spring 
and fall were combined, as they have very similar net load profiles.  We used four time-of-
day periods: morning, midday, evening, and night (Table 10).  Thus we had 24 different 
classifications for each wind scenario. 
3. For each interval, we found the ramp percentage (percent change in net load from previous 
interval).  We then calculated the mean and standard deviation of ramp percentage for each 
of the 24 groups.  Figure 5 shows a sample PDF for ramp percentages in group 5: winter 
weekday mornings under the high wind scenario.  
4. For each group, we calculated uncertainty % as follows: 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡  (73) 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
−1 ∗ (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
(74) 
Table 11 and Table 12 show the calculated uncertainty percentages for each group. 
5. In each interval, net load was multiplied by the two uncertainty percentages for the 
appropriate group to find UncertaintyUp and UncertaintyDown for each interval.  
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Month Season 
January Winter 
February Winter 
March Spring/Fall 
April Spring/Fall 
May Spring/Fall 
June Summer 
July Summer 
August Summer 
September Summer 
October Spring/Fall 
November Spring/Fall 
December Winter 
Table 9 - Seasonal classification of months based on similar net load profiles, used for uncertainty calculations. 
 
Time Period Hours 
Morning 04 - 09 
Midday 10 - 16 
Evening 17 - 20 
Night 21 - 03 
Table 10 - Classification of hourly intervals into time periods based on ramping characteristics, used for 
uncertainty calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5 - PDF of 10-minute net load ramp percentage in Group 5: winter weekday mornings under the high wind 
scenario.  We see much more need for URC than DRC in this group.  Bins containing the mean as well as 
plus/minus two standard deviations from the mean are highlighted.  In this distribution, two standard deviations 
from the mean represents a 96% confidence interval. 
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Uncertainty in Low Wind Scenario 
Season Weekday 
Time of 
Day 
Group 
Number 
Uncertainty Up 
(% of Net Load) 
Uncertainty Down 
(% of Net Load) 
Winter 
Weekend 
Morning 1 1.34% -0.46% 
Midday 2 0.72% -0.75% 
Evening 3 1.92% -1.28% 
Night 4 0.30% -1.52% 
Weekday 
Morning 5 2.26% -0.79% 
Midday 6 0.54% -0.74% 
Evening 7 1.55% -1.17% 
Night 8 0.39% -1.63% 
Spring/Fall 
Weekend 
Morning 9 1.75% -0.50% 
Midday 10 0.82% -0.98% 
Evening 11 1.77% -1.24% 
Night 12 0.55% -1.82% 
Weekday 
Morning 13 2.68% -0.87% 
Midday 14 0.60% -0.93% 
Evening 15 1.39% -1.26% 
Night 16 0.81% -2.09% 
Summer 
Weekend 
Morning 17 2.28% -0.81% 
Midday 18 1.21% -0.72% 
Evening 19 1.04% -1.34% 
Night 20 0.69% -2.35% 
Weekday 
Morning 21 2.46% -0.34% 
Midday 22 0.96% -0.74% 
Evening 23 0.82% -1.39% 
Night 24 0.72% -2.43% 
Table 11 - Uncertainty in each direction as a percentage of net load for each of 24 groups in the  low wind 
scenario 
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Uncertainty in Low Wind Scenario 
Season Weekday 
Time of 
Day 
Group 
Number 
Uncertainty Up 
(% of Net Load) 
Uncertainty Down 
(% of Net Load) 
Winter 
Weekend 
Morning 1 1.62% -0.70% 
Midday 2 1.00% -1.04% 
Evening 3 2.12% -1.52% 
Night 4 0.60% -1.88% 
Weekday 
Morning 5 2.60% -1.00% 
Midday 6 0.79% -0.97% 
Evening 7 1.71% -1.43% 
Night 8 0.63% -1.94% 
Spring/Fall 
Weekend 
Morning 9 2.33% -0.86% 
Midday 10 1.31% -1.58% 
Evening 11 2.24% -1.69% 
Night 12 1.06% -2.42% 
Weekday 
Morning 13 3.14% -1.11% 
Midday 14 0.99% -1.41% 
Evening 15 1.78% -1.67% 
Night 16 1.23% -2.62% 
Summer 
Weekend 
Morning 17 2.87% -1.14% 
Midday 18 1.71% -1.24% 
Evening 19 1.44% -1.86% 
Night 20 1.39% -3.17% 
Weekday 
Morning 21 3.05% -0.67% 
Midday 22 1.31% -1.13% 
Evening 23 1.18% -1.85% 
Night 24 1.23% -3.08% 
Table 12 - Uncertainty in each direction as a percentage of net load for each of 24 groups in the high wind 
scenario 
 
3.  Results and Discussion 
3.1 Procurement of Ramp Capability 
As demonstrated in Figure 2, URC and DRC was not expected to be procured in every interval, due to 
either the existence of the demand curve or to the lack of a need for additional ramp capability beyond 
what is already available in the system.  Table 13 and Table 14 show the percentage of intervals that fell 
into each category of procurement shown in Figure 2, as well as the average quantity procured in 
intervals where a redispatch occurred. 
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Some quantity of up-ramp capability was procured in 13-20% of intervals depending on the month 
and wind scenario.  These were the only intervals in which the existence of the URC product had any 
impact on commitment or dispatch.  In the day-ahead market, we note that the $10/MWh price cap was 
a limiting factor far less frequently than in the real-time market, and in fact there were no day-ahead 
intervals in which all targeted URC was too expensive, whereas this occurred in 10-17% of intervals in 
the real-time market.  This was due to the ability of the day-ahead market to commit additional 
resources to meet the up-ramp capability target, while the real-time market could only use resources 
previously committed.  In those intervals in which a redispatch did occur, approximately 26-32 MW of 
URC was procured in the day-ahead market and 62-83 MW in the real-time market. 
Results for the down-ramp capability product are somewhat more surprising, as no additional DRC 
was procured in any interval in any scenario.  Essentially, this product had no impact on either the 
commitment or the dispatch, indicating that the system under the baseline model was sufficiently 
flexible to meet all down-ramping needs.  It is worth noting a related outcome here: there was no wind 
curtailment in the baseline model.  It is expected that these results would go hand-in-hand; wind 
curtailment in the baseline model would be reduced by down-ramp capability procured in the ramp 
capability model.  However, there is wind curtailment within the real -world MISO system [23], and 
therefore there is a need for DRC.  This indicates that our scaled-down system is more flexible, at least in 
the down-ramp direction, than MISO’s system as a whole.  Possible reasons why our model power 
system fails to represent the lack of flexibility of MISO (and the associated occurrence of wind 
curtailment episodes) include the following: 
1. Transmission constraints: Much of MISO’s wind curtailment occurs in transmission constrained 
areas where wind capacity makes up a much higher percentage of the generation capacity than 
the system as a whole [23], and therefore more flexibility is required.  As a simplification, we 
did not include transmission constraints in our model, so curtailment due to congestion did not 
occur. 
2. Ramp rate assumptions: Generator operating parameters are not typically public knowledge.  
Therefore we relied on academic and government research papers to assist with the needed 
assumptions.  It is possible that our coal plant ramp rates, particularly plant 4 (see Table 4) may 
have been too high.  Because coal plants have lower marginal costs than natural gas plants, 
they are generally dispatched at their highest levels.  This combined with the overestimated 
ramp rates led to increased down-ramp capability. 
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3. Minimum generation levels: As noted in 2.4.2, we reduced our original assumptions for 
minimum generation levels for several plants in order to ensure that plants could startup or 
shutdown without violating either the minimum generation or maximum ramp rate constraints.  
This was necessary because our model does not use different ramp rates during startup and 
shutdown intervals.  However, this simplification increased the amount of downward flexibility 
for any generator operating above its minimum level. 
4. Wind volatility: It is possible that the simulated wind data that we used is less volatile or that 
the simulated forecasts were more accurate than typical wind farms in the MISO region, either 
of which would lead to a decreased need for wind curtailment. 
  URC Procurement 
Average 
quantity 
procured 
when 
change in 
dispatch 
occurs 
(MW) 
  No URC Procured URC Procured 
  
No URC 
Targeted 
System 
Sufficiently 
Flexible; 
Target Met 
URC too 
Expensive; 
Demand 
Curve 
Price 
Exceeded 
Procured 
All 
Targeted 
URC 
Procured 
Some 
Targeted 
URC; 
Demand 
Curve 
limits full 
quantity 
January 
Low Wind 
Day-Ahead 23% 62% 0% 1% 14% 30 
Real-Time 21% 54% 10% 2% 12% 62 
January 
High Wind 
Day-Ahead 19% 66% 0% 1% 15% 31 
Real-Time 18% 56% 14% 2% 11% 73 
April Low 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 22% 64% 0% 1%  13% 26 
Real-Time 18% 60% 9% 2% 10% 62 
April High 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 15% 65% 0% 4% 16% 31 
Real-Time 14% 54% 17% 5% 11% 71 
July Low 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 27% 56% 0% 0% 17% 31 
Real-Time 21% 54% 10% 1% 15% 72 
July High 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 19% 61% 0% 0% 20% 32 
Real-Time 13% 55% 13% 1% 18% 83 
Overall 
Low Wind 
Day-Ahead 24% 61% 0% 1% 15% 29 
Real-Time 20% 56% 10% 2% 12% 65 
Overall 
High Wind 
Day-Ahead 18% 64% 0% 1% 17% 31 
Real-Time 15% 55% 14% 3% 13% 76 
Table 13 - Up-Ramp Capability Procurement Categories.  For each month and wind combination, this table shows 
the frequency of each category of procurement.  Note that the two categories in which URC are procured are the 
only intervals when the dispatch changes.    
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  DRC Procurement 
  No DRC Procured DRC Procured 
  
No DRC 
Targeted 
System 
Sufficiently 
Flexible; 
Target Met 
Procurement 
too Expensive; 
Demand Curve 
Price Exceeded 
Procured 
All 
Targeted 
DRC 
Procured Some 
Targeted DRC; 
Demand Curve 
limits full 
procurement 
January 
Low Wind 
Day-Ahead 20% 80% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 13% 87% 0% 0% 0% 
January 
High Wind 
Day-Ahead 16% 84% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 13% 87% 0% 0% 0% 
April Low 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 16% 84% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 14% 86% 0% 0% 0% 
April High 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 14% 86% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 13% 87% 0% 0% 0% 
July Low 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 30% 70% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 25% 75% 0% 0% 0% 
July High 
Wind 
Day-Ahead 24% 76% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 19% 81% 0% 0% 0% 
Overall 
Low Wind 
Day-Ahead 22% 78% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 17% 83% 0% 0% 0% 
Overall 
High Wind 
Day-Ahead 18% 82% 0% 0% 0% 
Real-Time 15% 85% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 14 - Down-Ramp Capability Procurement Categories.  For each month and wind combination, this table 
shows the frequency of each category of procurement.  Note that DRC is never procured, so the addition of the 
DRC product does not alter the dispatch. 
 
 
3.2 Reliability 
We find that the URC product significantly improved system reliability, particularly as wind 
penetration increased.  In our simulation, system reliability problems were represented by energy and 
spinning reserve shortages in the results of the real-time economic dispatch model.  An energy shortage 
occurs when there is insufficient generation committed to meet demand and is a severe problem, 
whereas a spinning reserve shortage leaves the system vulnerable to outages.   In the baseline model, 
between 1 - 6% of intervals contained energy shortages depending on the month and wind scenario 
(Figure 6), while 16 - 25% of intervals contained spinning reserve shortages (Figure 7).  In each month, 
there were more shortages under the high-wind scenario.  The URC product universally reduced both 
types of shortages in all month/wind scenario combinations; on average, energy shortages were cut in 
half and reserve shortages reduced by 24%. 
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It is important to note that these occurrences were much higher in our model than they are in 
reality.  In 2010, for example, MISO experienced spinning reserve shortages in just over 1% of all real -
time intervals [24] and likely did not have any actual energy shortages.  This is because MISO has a 
number of ways to deal with potential shortage events that are outside of the scope of our model, such 
as an additional short-term unit commitment run, the ability to curtail load via demand response 
programs, and the manual dispatch (bypassing the outcome of the optimization models) of very 
expensive fast ramping generators.  Nevertheless, these intervals represent intervals in which there is a 
potential reliability problem, and their reduction is beneficial. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Percent of intervals in real-time economic dispatch that contain an energy shortage.  Note that there 
are more shortages in high-wind scenarios in the baseline model and that the ramp capability model reduces 
shortages in all  month/wind combinations. 
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Figure 7 - Percent of intervals in real-time economic dispatch with spinning reserve scarcity.  Note that there are 
more shortages in the high-wind scenario and that the ramp capability model reduces shortages in all  month/wind 
combinations. 
 
 
3.3 Prices 
The expected impacts of the URC product in the real-time market are slightly higher energy prices 
during typical intervals which are more than offset by a reduction in price spikes, leading to lower 
average prices overall.  The results of the simulation demonstrated this tradeoff.  Figure 8 shows that 
average market clearing energy prices in the baseline model ranged from $230-$407/MWh.  The URC 
product reduced prices by 17% to 37%, a savings of $40-$140/MWh.  Average real-time prices were 
much higher in the simulation than the $30-$60/MWh found in MISO’s market in 2010 [24].  This was 
due to the elevated frequencies of energy and spinning reserve shortages in the simulation described in 
section 3.2, which were associated with penalty prices of $3,500/MWh and $1,100/MWh respectively.  
Figure 9 shows that the average prices in non-shortage conditions were much closer to MISO’s actual 
average prices.  Here we see the expected slight increase of $1 - $2 needed to procure URC.   
As discussed in section 3.1, the ramp capability product did not procure any DRC.  While this clearly 
means that the DRC product produced no benefit to the system, it also did not incur any costs because 
the ramp capability products are priced solely based on the opportunity costs of procurement.  This 
illustrates the low-risk nature of implementing the URC and DRC products when compared to other 
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ancillary services.  In intervals when they are not necessary to ensure system flexibility, they will cost 
nothing.       
 
 
Figure 8 - Average real-time energy market clearing price.  Note the prices are very high compared to generators’ 
marginal costs due to high penalty prices associated with energy and reserve shortage intervals and that the ramp 
capability model decreases prices in all month/wind combinations. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Average real-time energy market clearing price in non-shortage intervals.   
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3.4 Generation Fuel Mix and CO2 emissions 
We would expect the implementation of the ramp capability product to result in some amount of 
fuel switching from less flexible coal generators to more flexible natural gas generators as well as a 
corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions, as natural gas plants have a lower carbon intensity.  Figure 10 
shows this expectation held true, with a reduction of 0% to 1.2% of coal generation and 0% to 0.5% of 
CO2 emissions with the ramp capability model in place.  These figures may seem somewhat small, but 
given that the ramp capability product caused a change in dispatch in only 13-20% of intervals, and the 
URC procured was on the order of 1%-3% of total load, the amount of fuel switching is reasonable. 
As discussed in section 3.1, our baseline model did not prescribe any wind curtailment, nor did the 
ramp capability model procure any DRC, both of which are results that do not likely reflect real -world 
conditions.  Had wind been curtailed in the baseline model, we would have seen higher CO 2 emissions in 
the baseline model as wind generation was replaced by fossil fuel generation.  To the extent that the 
DRC product would have reduced the amount of wind curtailment, we would have seen increased CO 2 
emissions savings under the ramp capability model. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Percent reduction in coal generation and CO2 emissions with the ramp capability products relative to 
the baseline model 
 
-1.4%
-1.2%
-1.0%
-0.8%
-0.6%
-0.4%
-0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
January
Low Wind
January
High Wind
April Low
Wind
April High
Wind
July Low
Wind
July High
Wind
%
C
h
an
ge
Impact of Ramp Capability Product on Coal 
generation and CO2 Emissions
Change in Coal Generation 
High Wind 
Change in Coal Generation 
Low Wind 
Change in CO
2
 Emissions 
High Wind 
Change in CO
2
 Emissions 
Low Wind 
45 
 
4. Conclusion 
Within our scaled-down representation of MISO’s power system, we find that the implementation 
of the proposed up-ramp capability product provides significant reliability benefits by altering the 
commitment and dispatch so that more flexible resources are available to quickly ramp up generation 
when needed.  This results in fewer intervals in the real -time market in which there is a shortage of 
either energy or spinning reserve.  While there is a small price increase in non-shortage intervals due to 
the procurement of URC, this is far outweighed by the avoidance of huge penalty prices associated with 
shortage intervals.  A secondary effect of the URC product is a small amount of fuel switching from coal 
to the more flexible natural gas, which slightly reduces the system’s overall CO2 emissions.  However, 
the more pronounced environmental benefit is the ability of the URC product to help the system absorb 
increased wind penetration while avoiding most of the corresponding increase in reliability problems.  
Although the DRC product had no impact within our simulation, we believe that it would be beneficial in 
any system, such as MISO, in which wind is curtailed.   
Future work should include running the simulation on a more realistic test system that includes 
transmission constraints and more realistic ramp rate assumptions.  In addition, a short-term unit 
commitment model should be added in order to more closely mirror MISO practices and better manage 
the transition between the day-ahead market with hourly intervals and the real-time market with 10-
minute intervals.  Such a model would likely reduce the frequency of shortage events and allow a more 
accurate assessment of the price-related benefits of the ramp capability products.  Finally, it would be 
useful to conduct a parametric analysis of shortage penalty prices, ramp-capability demand curve, target 
levels of spinning reserve and ramp capability, and forecast errors for wind and load to determine ways 
in which these parameters should be chosen in relation to the size and characteristics of the system 
represented.  The values for these parameters used in our analysis correspond to the values in MISO’s 
system and may not be appropriate for a scaled down and simplified system as in our simulation.   
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